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JOHN NAGLE'S SCHOLARSHIP ON THE MEANINGS
OF POLLUTION: FROM SMOG AND CELL PHONE
TOWERS TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND
PORNOGRAPHY
JB Ruhl* &James Salzman**
INTRODUCTION

John Nagle was a valued friend of ours and a valued colleague.
We wrote a casebook together1 and enjoyed each other's company at
environmental law workshops and conferences. 2 He wrote on an
impressively wide range of topics and was perhaps best known for his
scholarship on the Endangered Species Act. In deciding how to honor
his memory, we decided to highlight a long-running focus of his
scholarship that is not as well known but, we believe, merits the
attention and respect of scholars today and going forward. This Essay,
therefore, reviews his work on pollution in all its forms.
Pollution is, of course, the central problem of environmental law.
Picture a landscape crying for protection and a scene likely comes to
mind of chimneys belching smoke into the air, pipes disgorging
effluent into a murky river, and barrels of leaking waste sent goodness
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1 J.B. RUHL,JOHN COPELAND NAGLE &JAMES SALZMAN, THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (3d ed. 2008).
2
One of our fondest such memories was funded by a generous grant we received
from the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation to support the expenses of meeting to
plan the casebook. After researching travel and lodging options, we found that flying to
Jacksonville and renting a beach condo on Amelia Island was less expensive than the three
of us gathering at one of our home locations. With perfect weather, we punctuated working
on a deck overlooking a lushly forested golf course fairway with walks to the beach and
forays into the Atlantic. We are confident the casebook benefited significantly.
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knows where, but nowhere good. Most of our environmental laws have
been developed to address variants of this Dickensian landscape.
Approaching fifty years old, modern environmental law is well
established and has developed sophisticated strategies to combat
traditional pollution threats.
John Nagle's great insight was to realize that pollution comes in
many forms. He established that the concept of moral pollution long
predated the contemporary understanding of environmental
pollution, though that is now the common meaning of the term. He
recognized that the tools and insights developed to address traditional
pollution threats could equally inform how we can address the threats
posed by non-traditional pollution-from the societal pollution of
pornography to campaign finance. He equally recognized that the
environmental toolkit did not work well when applied to visual or
aesthetic pollution-from the Mojave Desert and Theodore Roosevelt
National Park to cell phone towers.
His analysis of the different forms of pollution was so ingenious
that it defies a simple categorization. For this Essay, we have created a
simple division between aesthetic pollution in the environment,
described in Part I, and societal pollution, explored in Part II.
I.

NON-TRADITIONAL POLLUTION IN THE ENVIRONMENT

In his 2009 essay, Cell Phone Towers as Visual Pollution, Nagle uses
battles against construction of cell phone towers as an example of the
broader targeting of visual pollution.3 In this category, he includes
ugly buildings, billboards, flags, and signs, among other aesthetic
clutter on the landscape. 4 As he wrote, "[t]hese offensive sights are
polluting agents because their appearance is found objectionable." 5
Unlike the health impacts of air and water pollution, though, visual
pollution gives offense, inhibits enjoyment of the place, and may even
lower property values. So what is to be done?
The law has long struggled over how, and even whether, to
recognize visual pollution as an actionable harm.
Traditionally,
aesthetic complaints were not regarded as an actionable nuisance. 6
This gave way through the twentieth century to zoning laws explicitly
regulating visual appearance in communities and, thanks to the efforts

3 John Copeland Nagle, Cell Phone Towers as Visual Pollution, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 537 (2009).
4 Id. at 538.
5 Id. at 539.
6 Id. at 542.
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of Lady Bird Johnson and others, statutes regulating billboards under
the incongruously named Highway Beautification Control Act. 7
Tracing the history of courts and legislatures managing the
aesthetics of first power and then cell phone towers, Nagle sets out
three different strategies of how society responds to pollution. The
first is toleration.8 Environmental law recognizes that a certain amount
of pollution is actually a good thing. Our drinking water is regulated
not by the Pure Drinking Water Act but by the Safe Drinking Water
Act. 9 We don't require distilled water to flow through our taps because
it would be too expensive. We just mandate removal of the most
dangerous contaminant.
Same for air and water pollution, and
tolerance levels for pesticides. The second strategy is prevention.10
This is admirable as an aspiration but, for the reasons described above,
rarely achievable in practice. As a result, the third and most common
strategy is avoidance." Our laws encourage dilution, treatment, and
filtering of pollution so we can avoid the worst harms.12
Nagle makes clear that the desire of some groups to be free
entirely from the polluting effects of unwanted signs and towers is
understandable but not achievable because no environment is free
from pollution. 13 The key question is how much pollution is
acceptable. 14 Avoidance has been the dominant response to the visual
pollution of cell phone towers, but Nagle regarded this as a moving
target, and he has been proven right. 15 In the twelve years since he
wrote this essay, toleration has moved to the fore as people become
habituated to cell phone towers in the landscape. They may be
camouflaged to look like a pine tree, but they have become an
accepted part of the landscape.
Nagle considered the challenges of scenic pollution of national
parks in two articles published in close succession, The Scenic Protections
of the Clean Air Act, 16 and See the Mojave!17
Like many of Nagle's articles, See the Mojave! is as much history as
legal analysis. Regarded in early American history as a dreaded
landscape and dangerous territory for settlers to cross, the Mojave
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

See id. at 544.
See id. at 549-50.
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 300f-300j.
See id. at 550-51.
See id. at 551-53.
See id.
Id. at 566.
Id.
See id. at 567.

16

John Copeland Nagle, The Scenic Protections of the CleanAir Act, 87 N.D. L. REV. 571

(2011).
17 John Copeland Nagle, See the Mojave!, 89 OR. L. REV. 1357 (2011).
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Desert lies between Los Angeles and Las Vegas. 18 Later eyes saw it as a
mining resource, and then the military regarded it as a valuable
location for defense installations. 19 Only in the last few decades has it
come to be seen very differently-as a site of stunning natural beauty
worthy of protecting. 20 The stakes are even higher today as the newest
sets of eyes regard the Mojave as ideal territory for large scale solar
power. 21
Over time, then, the Mojave has been viewed as a wasteland, a
valuable resource, or a beautiful landscape. The challenge is that all
three coexist today. Nagle uses these different (and often mutually
exclusive) aesthetic understandings of the Mojave to explore how,
indeed whether, the state should even seek to regulate aesthetic
sensibilities. Is the Mojave wasteland, resource, or a scenic landscape,
and how should this be decided? It's not easy. As he puts it, "The law
has struggled with such contrasting perceptions of the same sights." 22
In tracing the legal management of the Mojave, from 1970s bills
to protect the desert to the California Desert Protection Act and
creation of Joshua Tree National Park, he shows that the aesthetic
appreciation of the Mojave is quite recent. His article was more
prescient than he could have known, for the conflict between scenic
preservation and large-scale renewables has only intensified since he
wrote the piece, with no easy way to resolve the different values. The
three different strategies he proposes to manage this impasse-the
Bureau of Land Management determining prospectively where
facilities may be built, Congress deciding this, or case-by-case
judgment-describe well the current thinking on this very challenge.
His overarching message is that the law does a poor job
considering the significance of visual aesthetics particularly when,
unlike a traditional national park, there is strongly held disagreement
over perceptions of the same landscape. With his typically adroit turn
of phrase, he writes, often "the same sight that some people treasure
is a sight that others find offensive." 23 In such cases, which are more
common than we appreciate, he calls for a decisionmaking process
structure to solicit public involvement that not only identifies the
contrasting perceptions but seeks to honor them.24
The Scenic Protections of the Clean Air Act was published just a year
later and explores many of the same themes but in the context of air

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

See id. at 1357-58, 1363.
See id. at 1361-66.
See id. at 1358.
See id. at 1378-79.
Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1360.
See id.
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quality in national parks.25 As he cleverly puts it, "Like the proverbial
falling tree in the forest, is a sight really spectacular if no one can see
it? The sightseeing quality of national parks disappears if the sights
cannot be seen."2 6 When each of our national parks was established,
air quality was taken as a given. The fact that the natural wonders could
be seen was the very justification for their legal protections.
Nagle uses the example of Theodore Roosevelt National Park in
North Dakota's badlands as his vehicle to explore the challenges in
preserving park visibility. When proponents of the park lobbied
Congress in the 1950s, they used the economic benefits of tourism as
a key argument. 27 They did not foresee, though, the boom in oil, coal
and gas development that would follow just three decades later. 28
Protecting the park's scenic beauty, the economic justification for park
designation, is now in direct conflict with the economic benefits from
the resource extractionjust outside the park boundaries. 29 How should
we mediate the original calls for preservation of the park's scenic
values versus newer demands on behalf of fossil fuel production's
economic benefits?
The Clean Air Act (CAA) speaks clearly to this challenge. 30
National parks are subject to special, more stringent protections than
other airsheds. 31 In practice, though, these protections have been
difficult to ensure. They have not protected the views at Theodore
Roosevelt National Park and many other parks around the country. 32
In assessing the reasons for this failure, Nagle studied carefully the
comments at a public hearing on EPA's proposed disapproval of North
Dakota's plan to comply with the CAA. He concludes that:
the implementation of the CAA's provisions will not necessarily
accomplish the statutory goal, the public commitment to scenic
values is not as strong as the statutory requirements for protecting
those values, and the cooperative federalism framework embedded
in the CAA confronts special difficulties in the context of visibility

issues.33
In a fascinating final section, Nagle points out the challenges
facing each actor in this drama. The EPA has no discretion to relax
standards. "The EPA is in an impossible position if the law requires it

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

See Nagle, supra note 16.
Id. at 572.
See id. at 573-75.
See id.
See id. at 574.
See id. at 589.
See id. at 574.
See id. at 595-601.
Id. at 575.
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to do one thing, but we want it to do something else." 34 The National
Park Service has no authority at all over the polluting activities. And
North Dakota's plan is subject to EPA approval. Not surprisingly, the
saga continues.
II.

THE IDEA OF POLLUTION BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Nagle's extension of the pollution concept to aesthetic concerns
was novel, but he pushed even harder in a line of his scholarship to
establish the pollution concept as a useful model for sorting through
controversial social issues far beyond those intersecting the
environment. This turn in his work began with Corruption, Pollution,
and Politics, a book review essay published in the Yale Law Journalin
2000.35 The review opens with a quote from Senator John McCain
praising the book, Elizabeth Drew's The Corruption of American Politics,
for its condemnation of the corrosive effects of money in American
politics. 36 The review thoroughly summarizes the book and places it in
the context of the broad debate in America about campaign finance
and other ways money influences politicians, 37 but Nagle ultimately
questions Drew's perspective 38 and is deeply critical of Drew's central
claim of corruption. 39 Nagle observes that Drew never defines
corruption, fails to engage the extensive scholarship on political
corruption, and offers no empirical dimension to justify the corruption
claim.40
Nagle then offers his own conceptualization of what
corruption means and how it can be detected, but ultimately rejects
corruption as the metaphor through which to assess the influence of
money in politics. 41 He proposed replacing it with ... pollution.4 2
Nagle acknowledges that the pollution metaphor had been used
before to describe the effects of money in politics, but those usages
were only as a metaphor, not as a platform for analytical exploration.
43
Why is the pollution metaphor better than the corruption
metaphor? Nagle argues that the pollution is more helpful in several
respects. First, it better captures the problem of money as an agent

34
35

Id. at 600.

John Copeland Nagle, Corruption, Pollution, and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 293 (2000)

(reviewing ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT
WRONG AND WHY (1999)).

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

See id. at 294.
See id. at 297-307.
See id.
See id. at 307-16.
Id. at 308.
See id. at 309-16.
See id. at 316-30.
See id. at 316-17.
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coming from outside the ecosystem-in this case politics-and
influencing how the system works.4 4 Second, it takes the focus off of
individual blameworthiness, recognizing that the outside agent of
money pollutes the system writ large.45 Third, the ways in which we
"clean up" pollution may offer insights into how to clean up campaign
finance.4 6 And lastly-and herein lies the glimmer of his work to
follow-Nagle observes that the pollution metaphor had been used by
advocacy movements against other social ills arising from expressive
activities, such as internet indecency and hate speech, that ultimately
faced First Amendment obstacles. 47 He concludes that campaign
finance reform could run into the same wall. 48 Indeed it did.4 9
One year after his book review essay on campaign finance, Nagle
published Moral Nuisances in the Emory Law Journal.50 An abbreviated
history of environmental law might describe common-law private and
public nuisance claims as the mainstays of pollution control until the
1970s, when the common law was eclipsed by a new and far more
extensive federal statutory regime. This is a gross and in many ways
inaccurate simplification, but it aligns with Nagle's purpose of
reminding us that at one time nuisance law was also a legal mechanism
for controlling morally offensive conduct. Nuisance law lumped
immorality in with environmental pollution as being in the same class
of offenses.
Nagle uses a contemporaneous real-life case study to resurface the
idea of moral nuisances as a still-viable legal concept. 51 A couple
purchased riverfront property in Oregon that turned out to be
adjacent to a public beach frequented by nudists-lots of them-who
often engaged in explicit sexual conduct within view of the couple's
property.52 Suffice it to say things did not go well from the couple's
perspective and they sued the state agency that managed the park,
alleging the agency was committing a private nuisance. 53 The trial
court dismissed the claim out of hand, but the appellate court
reversed, advising the lower court to apply standard nuisance fact
analysis. 54 The trial court did, finding that instances of nudity and
sexual conduct on the beach that were visible from the couple's
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 318-19.
See id. at 319-24.
See id. at 324-37.
Id. at 327-28.
See id. at 328-29.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265 (2001).
See id. at 265-66.
Id.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 266-67.
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property constituted private nuisances. 55 Nagle leverages this amusing
story to argue that, just like environmental pollution nuisances, moral
nuisance law is not dead. The parallels are striking. Immoral
conduct-brothels, saloons, billiard halls, and a long list of
undesirables-was fodder for nuisance claims through the nineteenth
century. 56 Like pollution control law, however, many states began
outlawing immoral conduct through statutory public nuisance
regimes. 57 And constitutional and other developments in civil rights
law began to extend preemptive protections to speech and other
expressive activities. 58 Morals also changed. The role of nuisance
doctrine in managing morality waned over time. 59 Yet, just as nuisance
doctrine has seen a resurgence in the pollution context, even serving
as the basis for climate change lawsuits, Nagle documents that it also
has seen renewed action in the morality setting. 60
Nagle steps back to ask whether this is legitimate terrain for
nuisance law, concluding that it is. 61 He argues that many injuries to a
landowner suffered from a neighbor's immoral actions fit within the
nuisance doctrine
framework, including weeding out the
hypersensitive plaintiff.62 He contends that the traditional doctrine,
combined with extant statutory and constitutional protections of some
controversial expressive actions, will prevent nuisance from becoming
a runaway train of morality management. 63 Nagle's last reason pulls in
concepts from environmental law's model for pollution control-the
citizen suit. Nagle argues that much like the "private attorney general"
purpose of the citizen suit provisions found in many environmental
laws, private moral nuisance actions could fill gaps in morality
management left open by unwilling or overburdened public
enforcement authorities.64 Such a role may be especially useful in
contexts beyond offensive nudity, Nagle suggests, such as
neighborhood drug dealing and other urban blights. 65
Nagle's work on campaign finance and moral nuisances laid the
platform for his more conceptual treatment of the pollution metaphor
in The Idea of Pollution, published in the UC Davis Law Review in 2009.66
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 269.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 267.
See id.
See id. at 267-68.
See id. at 267.
See id. at 321.
See id. at 275-302.
See id. at 302-15.
See id. 309-11.
See id. at 315-21.
John Copeland Nagle, The Idea of Pollution, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2009).
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This is an impressive, sweeping, lively, multidisciplinary examination
of the concept of pollution in use throughout history and across many
contexts. We cannot do it full justice here-our aim is to situate it in
Nagle's work and justify recommending for a deep reading.
Nagle was a cherished member of the environmental law
academic community, so he wisely opened the article in the abstract
with the recognition that "[p]ollution is the primary target of
environmental law." 67 But he quickly advises us that "environmental
pollution is hardly the only type of pollution." 68 A broader view of
pollution includes all "defilement" of human environments, natural
and cultural, and remains a theme in contemporary anthropological
literature, which studies the pollution beliefs of cultures throughout
the world. 69 Moreover, as Nagle had developed in his prior work, the
law responds or can respond to complaints of cultural pollution such
as hostile workplaces and pornography. 70 The article thus explores
how the idea of pollution can help society better understand and
respond to the undesired introduction of agents, whether they be
chemicals or words, into both natural environments and human
environments. 71

For lawyers, The Idea ofPollution offers a fascinating account of how
the concept of pollution has been used by English and American jurists
dating back centuries, and that its use came first in the cultural
context, not with respect to pollution of natural environments. Judges
described judicial bias, immoral conduct, political corruption, foreign
influence, prostitution, slavery, and other cultural harms as forms of
pollution. 72 But as pollution became the term of art for the developing
field of environmental science and began being picked up by legal
institutions to describe water and air degradation, the term gradually
became a defining feature of environmental law. 73 Although most
people now think of pollution in that context, judges still use the
metaphor to condemn degradation of human environments, such as
workplace discrimination and hostility, 74 and anthropologists use the
concept to describe forces degrading cultures. 75
Notwithstanding this history, however, Nagle ultimately concludes
that neither environmental law nor other fields of law and science have

67
69

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 1-2.

70

Id. at 2.

71
72
73
74
75

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

68

at 78.
at 10-16.
at 16-18.
at 9-20.
at 24-28, 49.
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defined pollution coherently so as to clearly designate what is and is
not pollution. 76 What constitutes pollution is context-based and can
change over time. So, what is the idea of pollution good for? Nagle
offers two broad responses, both of which turn on his underlying
project of breaking the idea of pollution out of its environmental law
box. First, the broader conception of pollution shows that, even in the
environmental degradation context, pollution beliefs and pollution
claims are ultimately normative. 77 As he put it, "[p] ollution beliefs
force people to ask what belongs where." 78 The second is that
pollution is a more complex causal phenomenon than is usually
framed in environmental law. The essence of pollution is harm; thus,
pollution beliefs demand a firm understanding of what causes
pollution's harms. 79 Nagle challenges us to carefully ask, when and
how does the emission of a chemical rise to constitute harm to a
natural environment so as to be deemed pollution? Likewise, when
and how does display of sexual images constitute harm to a human
environment so as to be deemed pollution (a.k.a pornography)?
These have not been easy questions for the law. The Idea of Pollution
thus encourages further thought regarding how the law responds to
pollution claims in all of the places that are of concern to society.
The final installment in this line of innovative scholarship is
Pornography as Pollution, published in the Maryland Law Review in
2011.80 Nagle referred to pornography many times in his three
previous articles as an example of cultural pollution, so it seems
inevitable that he would eventually make it the topic of a full article. 81
But Pornography as Pollution has a twist to it, especially coming on the
heels of The Idea of Pollution. Whereas the earlier piece sought to
restore the idea of pollution to extend beyond its modern
environmental law meaning, 82 Pornography as Pollution argues that
policy should use the environment law concept to better manage
pornography in our culture. 83 As Nagle explains, "[p] ornography [as
a legal matter] has long been seen as a First Amendment problem-

76
77
78
79
80

See id. at 50-72.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 72.
See id. at 72-73.
John Copeland Nagle, Pornographyas Pollution, 70 MD. L. REV. 939 (2011).
See generally, Nagle, supra note 35, at 296 (observing that "[c]ultural pollution

81
caused by ...

pornographic ...

entertainment media" has led to a debate about the need

for government regulation); Nagle, supra note 66, at 28 (suggesting that the "idea of
pollution can aid in analyzing ... pornography").
82
See Nagle, supra note 66, at 28.

83

See Nagle, supra note 80, at 940.
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unavoidably and rightly so. But, pornography is not just a First
Amendment problem." 84 It is also a pollution problem.
Nagle acknowledges that rhetorical references to pornography as
pollution are common, but he takes the description more literally and
applies principles of environmental law to consider how to design a law
of pornography. 85 He describes environmental law as seeking to "(1)
prevent some pollution from occurring at all, (2) control other pollution
so it does not enter the environment, (3) facilitate the separation of
pollution that does reach the environment from those it could harm,
and (4) tolerate the presence of some pollution." 86 Nagle recognizes
that pornography is not like environmental pollution in all respectsin particular, pornography that is not obscene may be constitutionally
protected speech 87-but makes the case that these four strategies could
usefully be applied even if pornography cannot legally be regulated
the same way as industrial pollutants.88
Our purpose here is not to walk through his framework and
arguments on the specific matter of pornography. Rather, our focus
is on Nagle's innovative conception of pollution as a metaphor
through which to step back from environmental law, where it is so
firmly and nearly exclusively entrenched, and consider how the idea
informs many other social and cultural legal challenges. Indeed, Nagle
closes the circle of this theme in Pornography as Pollution. After all, he
observes, "[e]nvironmental law is familiar with discussions of
pollution, a term that derived from a sense of moral defilement." 89 In
Pornography as Pollution, student becomes teacher, as environmental
law's strategies for managing pollution of nature offer lessons for how
law can manage a cultural defilement such as pornography.
CONCLUSION

Although we were aware that John had a diverse scholarship
footprint, we knew his work primarily through the collaboration on
our casebook, for which he took the lead on materials covering
biodiversity, public lands, and climate change. Those were the lenses
through which we thought ofJohn, and our original intention for this
tribute was to focus on his scholarship in one of those realms. When
we examined his publication history, however, we realized he had
84
85
86
87

Id.
See id. at 940-41.
Id. at 941.
Id. at 951.

88

Using the example of China, Nagle also observes that even when such legal

constraints do not exist, simply regulating pornography away is exceedingly difficult. See id.

at 955-59.
89 Id. at 984.
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produced a stream of work we had not fully appreciated-his creative
explorations of the "idea of pollution." We chose the articles covered
above to learn more aboutJohn and this body of his scholarship, albeit,
sadly, we could only do so posthumously. We found the same attributes
that characterized his work in the other domains with which we were
familiar-breadth and depth of exploration, thoughtful and careful
analysis, and a lively voice. This was no surprise to us, nor would it be
to anyone who knewJohn.

